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“… [The] accountancy profession in the United Kingdom was born in 
the context of government regulation of an intervention in the economy, 
and has continued to flourish in that context. Difficulties associated with 
the administration of the bankruptcy laws of the State provided a 
powerful incentive for the formation of a professional institute. 
Thereafter the profession developed in the context of a market for audit 
services that was to become legally required, and eventually gained a 
legal monopoly in its provision. … So much of the work of professional 
accountants resides within the interstices of State interventionist 
policies, not only in areas such as taxation and corporate restructuring, 
but also in their capacity as applied economic consultants, specialists 
in compilation of economic data and intelligence. 
 
Even though it is difficult to understand the contemporary significance 
of the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom without 
appreciating its mutual intertwining with the modern conception of the 
State, the profession itself has adopted a most entrepreneurial stance. 
It has repeatedly done what it has not done before …” (Hopwood, 
1985: 13-14). 
 
The intertwined relationships between accounting, accountancy bodies, 
accounting firms and the state1 have been an under-explored theme in the 
accounting literature. Accounting calculations play a major part in levying 
taxes, regulating property rights, managing wars, promoting financial 
discipline in the public sector and even persuading private capital to provide a 
particular kind of public accountability. The state has long used accounting 
calculations to manage and displace recurring crises of capitalism. It has even 
been suggested that “how the concept of capitalism was invented is an 
example of the influence of accounting ideas …” (Chiapello, 2007: 264).  In 
short, accounting is central to capitalism as a mode of production that, in its 
advanced form, exists in a mutually dependent and antagonistic relationship 
to the state, as a medium and outcome of the formation and reproduction of 
capitalism.  
 
                                                 
1 The state is best understood as an ensemble of institutional structures that 
have co-evolved with the contradictory pressures and demands of a capitalist 
economy. The government, courts, the church, law enforcement agencies and 
professional associations are examples of such institutional structures 
(Gramsci, 1971). 
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There is a complex and contradictory relationship between the state and the 
accounting industry. In the UK context, accountants have successfully 
mobilized powers of the state to secure markets, niches and monopolies to 
earn economic rents. Often the state has been instrumental in (re)formulating 
accounting and auditing regulation and preserving forms of self-regulation 
(Sikka, Willmott and Lowe, 1989). The state has used the services of 
accounting firms to restructure the public sector and privatize many industries. 
This seems to have coincided with a reluctance to expose major accounting 
firms to public scrutiny. For example, the state has suppressed critical reports 
and demonstrated unwillingness to investigate anti-social practices (Sikka and 
Willmott, 1995; Mitchell, Sikka and Willmott, 1998). Exceptionally, when the 
activities of accounting firms have threatened tax revenues and with it the 
operations of the state’s machinery, the state has occasionally investigated 
and prosecuted major accounting firms (Sikka, 2008a).  
 
Globalization has added new complexities to the relationship between the 
state and capital. Whilst the state is primarily confined to a defined 
geographical jurisdiction, capital is free to roam the world and shop for 
possibilities of lower costs, regulation and liabilities. Major corporations have 
often been able to persuade smaller states to enact desirable legislation. In 
turn, corporations have used this as a lever to squeeze concessions from 
larger states and reconfigure the economic and regulatory environment 
(Hampton and Abbott, 1999; Palan, 2002). Such strategies are dependent 
upon the availability of political and financial resources and accounting firms 
seem to have considerable supply of both, especially as accounting firms are 
a significant fraction capital and the UK state has on occasion sought 
competitive advantage for local firms by refusing to co-operate with regulators 
from other countries (Arnold and Sikka, 2001). 
 
How relationships between accounting and the state develop are, it seems, 
contingent upon the formation of specific economies and, increasingly, upon 
institutional standardization initiatives pursued by global accounting firms and 
advanced capitalist states.  The world of auditing is dominated by just four big 
firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & 
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Young) whose combined global income of US$96 billion2 is exceeded by the 
gross domestic product of only 55 nations3. In common with other fractions of 
capital, they too roam the world in search of opportunities to reduce their 
costs, increase revenues and swell profits. One, increasingly significant and 
growing aspect of their business concerns the provision of assistance in 
exploiting opportunities for profit enhancement presented by micro states 
commonly known as tax havens or offshore financial centres (hereafter OFCs) 
which offer lighter regulation, low/no tax and confidentiality. In providing a 
haven for capital, OFCs have rapidly grown in importance to become a 
“cornerstone of the process of globalization” (Palan et al., 1996: 180) and 
thereby introduce a new dimension and related complexities to theories of the 
state and dynamics of the state-accounting firm relationship. 
 
This chapter explores some trajectories in the relationship between the state 
and accounting firms by examining an episode in the auditor liability debate 
that gained fresh momentum in the UK in the mid-1990s. When major firms 
considered the UK state to be insufficiently responsive to their lobbying for the 
limitation of their liability, they exerted pressures upon the UK government by 
privately arranging for the drafting of a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Bill 
with the intention of persuading the government of Jersey, a small offshore 
financial centre, to enact the law so as to create a favourable liability regime. 
This strategic manoeuvre, we suggest, is illustrative of the “entrepreneurial 
stance” cited in Hopwood’s quotation at the beginning of this chapter and 
accounting firms’ preparedness to do what they have “not done before” in 
pursuit of a desirable environment, in this case a more benign and financially 
beneficial regulatory environment. It is, however, just one example of the 
numerous occasions on which the state has been mobilized to grant, preserve 
or enhance a number of privileges, including liability concessions, to auditing 
firms. 
 
                                                 
2 As per the most recent reviews on their respective websites; accessed on 7 
November 2008. 
3 As per World Bank 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf). 
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The chapter is divided into three further sections. The following section offers 
a perspective on the state-capital relationship that takes account of the 
globalization of economic activity including the expansion of accounting 
services in the context of the emergence of OFCs. We then look at the state-
firm relationship through the lens of debates about auditor liability. Attention is 
drawn to a number of liability concessions granted to auditing firms by the UK 
state before providing details of the way the firms mobilized Jersey in pursuit 
of a more advantageous regulatory regime. The final section discusses the 
significance of the case for the state-accounting firm relationship. 
 
STATE, CAPITAL AND GLOBALIZATION 
 
There are wide-ranging debates about the nature and concept of the state 
(Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987; Jessop, 1990, 2002). Here we follow the 
assessment that “the meaning of the state has shifted dramatically over the 
last thirty years and that the main forcing agent in that shift has been 
something called ‘globalization’ (whatever that may mean)” (Harvey, 2006, p. 
xvii). Whilst the significance and extent of globalization is contested by 
scholars (for a discussion see Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Bhagwati, 2004; Saul, 2005), there is considerable agreement over its 
association with the accelerating mobility of goods, services, capital, 
commodities, information and communications across national frontiers 
(Robinson, 2004). Such mobility has been promoted by a particular, neoliberal 
hegemony that prioritizes market-driven competition as the preferred 
mechanism of resource generation and allocation while admitting a subsidiary 
role for the state in supporting an infrastructure geared to supporting this 
priority (Harvey, 2000). A neoliberal order is not, then, one in which the state 
is entirely hollowed out (the aspiration of laissez faire liberalism). Rather, it is 
an order in which allocation through the market is systematically privileged, as 
manifest in forms of privatization and deregulation. The state is reconstructed, 
not dismantled, as an emphasis upon regulation to protect the vulnerable from 
risk is counterbalanced by its use to stimulate and facilitate private sector 
expansion. With this change of emphasis comes a greater preparedness to 
weaken regulations (e.g. credit restrictions) that protect the vulnerable when 
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these regulations are assessed to impede or penalize profitable private sector 
growth (Klimecki and Willmott, 2008). 
 
As a consequence of demutualizations and privatizations, the contemporary 
neoliberal state is largely excluded from direct involvement in the productive 
economic sphere, although recent events have made the state a reluctant 
acquisitor of a very substantial part of the banking sector (Elliott and Atkinson, 
2008). In principle, its role is to provide a legal and social framework that 
sanctifies private property; to supply public goods using private sector sub-
contractors where possible; and to secure public order by dispensing bourgeois 
justice. Maintaining this framework requires revenues raised through taxes on 
wages, savings and profits as well as goods and services - revenues that 
depend upon the activities of private businesses as employers and also public 
confidence in their practices and social obligations.   
 
The state’s dependence on capital to stimulate economic activity has made 
capital’s welfare – notably, in the form of supportive and permissive 
de/regulation - a central plank of domestic and foreign policies. As Hutton 
(1999) puts it, “The City [of London] has not just been the citadel of free 
financial markets; it has been the prime beneficiary of the most determined 
industrial policy sustained continuously by the British state in any branch of 
economic activity. Law, taxation, regulation and economic policy have been 
bent to suit its needs” (p. 61), with, it might be added, the recent socialization 
of its losses being the latest twist in this process (Elliott and Atkinson, 2008). 
The activities of the neoliberal state are dedicated primarily to stabilizing, 
enhancing the politico-economic context of business activity through a variety of 
and, ultimately rescuing de/regulatory and, when required, salvationary 
mechanisms.  
 
Such mechanisms do not rely, in the first instance, upon naked coercion but 
instead depend upon processes of moral and cultural leadership provided by the 
institutions of civil society (Gramsci, 1971) , notably education and the media 
and extending to the legitimating expertise provided by inter alia accounting 
firms. That is to say, the neoliberal project requires (popular) legitimation from 
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below in the form of, for example, a rising material standard of living, a sense of 
increasing personal wealth or, most recently, an understanding that opposition 
to bailing out the banks with public funds would be most disadvantageous to the 
very people – the ordinary taxpayer – who will pay for the funding with higher 
taxes and/or a deterioration in public services. The project of neo-liberalism is 
however, endemically problematic as the state faces competing demands from 
constituent elements of civil society as well as from fractions of capital. Faced 
with numerous, contradictory pressures, responses are politically expedient 
rather than rationally consistent. So, on occasion, pressures from some fractions 
of capital (e.g. to allow markets to eliminate the weak and to avoid ‘moral 
hazards’) may be resisted in preference for policies aimed at increasing public 
confidence in capitalism (e.g. to place failed banks, such as Northern Rock, in 
public ownership). 
 
We stressed earlier how nation states increasingly form part of an 
interdependent global system of states. Some commentators have argued that 
the contemporary neoliberal celebration of free trade, intensification of 
competition, lowering of trade barriers, removal of exchange controls and the 
accompanying increase in flows of capital and density of corporate networks 
heralds a slow death of the nation state (Ohmae, 1995). Yet, even in processes 
of globalization, states remain key actors. Attentive to the constraints of 
domestic politics and institutional structures, states co-operate politically and 
economically. Their coalition may reconstruct sovereignty but it is also intended 
to protect or increase their capacity to secure local capital and attract mobile 
capital. Forms of economic and political cooperation between otherwise 
antagonistic states are designed to create an environment conducive to the 
welfare of capital and thereby to finance the continuing supply of social order 
and basic public goods. Of course, these outcomes cannot be guaranteed as 
corporations have “no intrinsic commitment to product, to place, to country, or 
to type of economic activity. The commitment is to the accumulation of capital. 
Therefore, the capitalist will shift locus of economic engagement (product, 
place, country, type of activity) as shifts occur in the opportunities to maximize 
revenues from undertaking” (Wallerstein, 1996: 89). Nonetheless, states 
collectively, as well as individually, are engaged in securing and enhancing 
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the conditions (e.g. permissive company law and labour legislation) that 
improve the prospects of retaining or attracting capital investment as a 
condition of possibility of sustaining the economic activity that funds public 
goods. 
 
One key way in which the mobility of capital is facilitated and accelerated is 
through policies that enable business vehicles to enjoy a relative freedom of 
incorporation. Such vehicles can originate in one country, but be used to trade 
in others. Businesses can also own vehicles in other countries and collaborate 
with local networks to develop profitable opportunities. This enhanced 
capacity to exit, with the threat of economic turbulence that accompanies it, 
gives corporations considerable direct and indirect influence over government 
policies as the prospect of possible capital flight or strikes is factored into the 
policy-making process. Of most relevance for the present chapter, the 
increased mobility and associated leverage of capital on governments has 
been assisted by policies pursued by OFCs.  
 
Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) 
 
By the late 1990s, OFCs were estimated to hold about 50% of all cross-border 
assets (International Monetary Fund, 2000). Almost one-third of the world’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and half of global monetary stock passed 
through them at some stage (Oxfam, 2000). OFCs have often been 
established in micro, often small islands, states occupying a peripheral 
position in global markets. Lacking significant natural, human, diplomatic or 
military resources to develop their economies, such micro states have opted 
to specialize in developing a low-tax, lightly regulated jurisdictions for inter 
alia registering companies and investing in offshore funds. Historically, 
these states have relied upon such industries as agriculture and tourism but 
these sources of income are difficult to sustain in the face of competition from 
low-wage developing countries. When low growth and incomes failed to meet 
the economic aspirations of their citizens, the response by a number of micro 
states has been to mobilize the asset of sovereignty with its lawmaking 
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powers to charge rents for sheltering capital in a haven of anonymity, low 
taxes and light regulation (Hampton and Abbott, 1999; Donaghy and Clarke, 
2003).  
 
Key to the success of OFCs has been the development of policies allowing 
non-residents to escape regulation. This has provoked the accusation that 
OFCs “auction off their sovereignty to the highest bidder, reaping great 
rewards in the process …” (Drezner, 2001: 76-77) and enact “laws with the 
sole purpose of getting around the laws of other countries [and] sell their 
sovereignty and their law to the highest bidder” (The Guardian, 2 May, 2000). 
In larger, established states, the neoliberal pressures to erode or sell off 
sovereignty (e.g. deregulation) in an effort to entice or retain capital can be 
somewhat mitigated by civil pressures to incorporate consideration of other 
constituencies (e.g. trades unions, the consumers of public services). In 
contrast, in OFCs such countervailing pressures are often weak, even to the 
point that key beneficiaries of changes in the law are permitted to draft laws 
with little public scrutiny (Naylor, 1987).  
 
The legal facilities offered by OFCs are designed to be attractive to capital. In 
integrated world markets, businesses do not have to uproot and relocate their 
entire operations because most countries have accepted the principle that 
“legal persons could reside concomitantly in a number of jurisdictions (Palan, 
2002: 72)”. Once established, this principle has created “the risk that they 
would go shopping for the best bundles of regulation they could find” (ibid). 
Shopping for the best regulation deal is facilitated by networks of lawyers and 
business advisers who specialize in legally permissible ways of avoiding 
regulation (McCahery and Picciotto, 1995). Many businesses have improved 
and extended their regulatory options by establishing or renting residences in 
OFCs so as to take advantage of the diverse legal choices on offer.  
 
Needless to say, regulatory arbitrage has the capacity to undermine and 
destabilize the regulatory regimes developed by other states which find 
themselves under intensified pressures to offer regulatory concessions in 
order to retain capital within their jurisdiction.  In the following section, we 
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illustrate this phenomenon by reference to the politics of auditor liability 
arrangements. Accounting firms in the UK have historically relied upon the 
state to secure liability concessions. With the intensification of globalization 
and the opportunities that it presents, the possibility of transferring activities to 
an alternative jurisdiction, in the form of an OFC, has provided an additional, 
potent weapon to the arsenal of accounting firms seeking to minimize their 
liabilities. 
 
STATE AND ACCOUNTING FIRMS 
 
Our analysis of the pressure exerted upon UK state regulators by the attempt 
to secure limited liability in an OFC is appropriately situated in a history of 
patronage from the UK state which has enabled accountants to secure 
prestige, niches, markets and eventually a state guaranteed monopoly of the 
external audit function. Accountants, as auditors, have cemented their social 
privileges on the basis of claims that their expertise mediates uncertainty and 
limits risks – to investors and markets as well as to employees and citizens - 
by preparing independent and objective, true and fair, accounts of corporate 
financial affairs. Auditors’ knowledge claims are, however, precarious, not 
least because measures of revenues, costs, assets, liabilities and profits are 
all contested technically as well as politically and because capitalist 
economies are inherently prone to crises (O’Connor, 1987). As a 
consequence, claims to expertise are frequently punctured by unexpected 
corporate collapses, frauds and failures. For example, Lehman Brothers, 
America’s fourth largest investment bank, received an unqualified audit 
opinion on its annual accounts on 28 January 2008, followed by a clean bill of 
health on its quarterly accounts on 10 July 2008. However, by early August it 
was experiencing severe financial problems and filed for bankruptcy on 14 
September 2008 (Sikka, 2008c). Such events fuel the suspicion that auditors 
lack the requisite independence or the expertise to check on the `truth’ and 
`fairness’ of company accounts. The severest problem for accounting firms is 
that when auditing reports are seen to fail, auditors face financial claims from 
other fractions of capital – investors and creditors - on the grounds that their 
losses are, in part, attributable to auditor negligence or incompetence. If 
 11
successful, such claims reduce surpluses payable to partners as they erode 
both the financial and symbolic capital invested in accounting firms. Rather 
than leaving the resolution of such disputes to market forces or private 
prosecutions for damages, firms have sought to mobilize elements of the state 
to de/regulate the form, organization and liability of auditing firms.  
 
As our brief overview implies, the regulation of auditor liability is a complex 
and contested matter. Processes of regulation face competing pressures from 
fractions of capital and from sections of civil society.  The picture is even more 
complex as, in the case of auditor liability, accounting firms and especially 
their partners, for whom the form of regulation has direct implications for the 
security and expansion of their wealth, their accountability and taxation, may 
take differing positions on the balance of anticipated benefits and 
disadvantages, symbolic as well as material. The content and dynamic of the 
regulatory regime is, accordingly, a product of financial and political as well as 
ideological resources that are institutionalized and mobilized by the various 
protagonists who have invested their roles in divergent discourses of 
regulation. 
 
The UK state has a long history of sheltering capital through a variety of 
corporate, partnership and insolvency laws. The Limited Liability Act 1855 
was a major development as it enabled entrepreneurs to limit their losses. 
During the Victorian era, accountants tended to operate as sole traders and 
partnerships (Brown, 1905), either because they were too small or found 
these structures most amenable for projecting an image of integrity, 
respectability and reliability, as well as providing a favourable basis of 
taxation. In the early twentieth century, there were debates about auditor 
liability, but auditors generally remained content with their position (Napier, 
1997). The Companies Act 1948 formally completed the qualified 
accountants’ monopoly of the external audit function. Section 161(2) 
prohibited company auditors from trading through limited liability entities by 
stating that “None of the following persons shall be qualified for appointment 
as auditor of a company … (3) a body corporate …”. In many ways, the 
legislation confirmed the favoured means of trading by accountants. Many 
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traded as partnerships and ‘joint and several’ liability was established as the 
norm where partners were liable for their own and each others’ negligence 
and omissions. This settlement began to come under strain as a process of 
consolidation and concentration – that is, the advance of monopoly capital – 
resulted in client companies becoming larger and auditors fearing greater 
financial liability from exposure from audit failures. 
 
Since the 1970s, major accounting firms have campaigned to dilute their audit 
liability to shareholders and other stakeholders (Cousins et al., 1999). In the 
mid-1980s, the state responded by granting a number of liability concessions. 
Section 310 of the Companies Act 1985, as amended by Section 137 of the 
Companies Act 1989, enabled companies to buy insurance for its Directors 
and Officers, which included auditors. The Companies Act 1989 granted 
auditing firms the right to limit their partners’ liability by trading as limited 
liability companies. Auditing firms received a further boost to their claims for 
limiting liability from the UK House of Lords’ judgement in Caparo Industries 
plc v Dickman & Others [1990] 1 All ER HL 568. This judgement established 
that, in general, auditors owed a ‘duty of care’ only to the company, as a legal 
person, and not to any individual shareholder or creditor. The UK government 
additionally enhanced the protection afforded to accountants and other 
advisors through the concept of ‘contributory negligence’ (UK Law 
Commission, 1993). This enabled auditors to argue that the negligence of 
other parties (e.g. directors, bankers) contributed to the damages suffered by 
plaintiffs and therefore that the damages against them should be 
correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, despite these concessions, major 
auditing firms wanted to minimize their responsibilities or ‘exposure’, and 
therefore campaigned for full proportional liability and a ‘cap’ (Likierman, 
1989; Big Eight, 1994).  
 
Accounting Firms, Globalization and Offshore Financial Centres 
 
By the early 1990s, some UK firms began considering the possibility of 
forming Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) to shield their partners from 
lawsuits (Accountancy, December 1994, p. 23). This was encouraged by 
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developments in the US where some states offered LLPs to accountants and 
other professionals in order to limit their liability (Alberta Law Review, 1998). 
In the mid-1990s, a report commissioned by the UK government (UK 
Department of Trade and Industry, 1996) was poised to reject some of the 
liability concessions demanded by accounting firms. At this time, Ernst & 
Young and Price Waterhouse (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) had, 
coincidentally enough, hired a London law firm, at a cost of nearly £1 million, 
to draft a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Bill that would shield partners 
from liability lawsuits. The government of Jersey (part of the Channel Islands) 
had been approached by these firms; and its leading politicians had promised 
to ‘fast track’ the law (Financial Times, 26 September 1996, p. 7). It was 
reported that those politicians had declared themselves to be “fighting for the 
City of London’s business, and we are doing this to prove we can enact 
legislation which is in the interest of fast-moving corporations” (The 
Accountant, August 1996, p. 1).  
 
Once the seriousness of the two accounting firms’ intent had been clearly 
signalled, they moved to demand equivalent liability concessions from the UK 
government. Ratcheting up the pressure, they stated that if their demands 
were not met they would leave the UK4 and trade through LLPs in Jersey 
(Financial Times, 24 July 2006, p. 9). Ernst & Young reportedly “threatened to 
move its [UK] headquarters to Jersey” (The Guardian, 8 November 1996, p. 
21). This was perhaps the first time that accounting firms had enrolled the 
lawmaking powers of a smaller state (Jersey) to squeeze, or perhaps 
hammer, concessions from a larger state.  
 
Why Jersey? 
 
The choice of Jersey, a UK Crown Dependency, is unsurprising for a number 
of reasons. Though geographically closer to France, Jersey’s main official 
language is English. With a population of 89,000, it is only 100 miles (160 km) 
south of mainland Britain and has established connections with the City of 
                                                 
4 The campaign was also supported by 25 other professional groups 
(Financial Times, 17 April 1996, p. 8). 
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London. Its currency, the Jersey pound, is tied to the value of sterling. Yet, 
Jersey is neither part of the UK nor a member of the European Community 
(EC). As part of its accession to the EC, the UK negotiated a special status 
(Protocol 3) which enables its Crown Dependencies to trade favourably with 
the EC, but without adopting any of its laws or obligations (Plender, 1990). 
Under the evolved constitutional arrangements, the UK government is 
responsible for their defence and international relations and ultimately for their 
“good government” (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1998, 
cols. 471 and 465; 27 January 1997, col. 33).  
 
In common with other states, Jersey can use its lawmaking powers to protect 
or privilege the position of elite groups – powers that extend not only to 
sheltering capital but also to enacting legislation intended to shield accounting 
firms from liability lawsuits. Since the 1960s, policies have been pursued to 
establish Jersey as an OFC as a means of supplementing its traditional 
economy based on agriculture and tourism (Hampton, 1996; Hampton and 
Abbott, 1999). In common with other OFCs, Jersey has sought to attract 
business by offering low/no tax, light regulation and business confidentiality5. 
So light is its regulatory touch that it led the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (1998) to describe Jersey as a “harmful” tax 
haven. It had also been criticized by the UK government (UK Home Office, 
1998) for the absence of independent regulation of the financial sector, 
inadequate consumer protection laws and lack of complaints investigation 
procedures. Notably, limited liability entities registered in Jersey are not 
required to publish audited financial statements. The very success of such 
policies has made Jersey highly dependent on financial services and 
                                                 
5 Its light regulation had drawn criticisms from international regulators. For 
example, the New York Assistant District Attorney investigating frauds at the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (United States, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992; Arnold and Sikka, 2001) complained 
that, “My experience with both Jersey and Guernsey has been that it has not 
been possible for US law enforcement to collect evidence and prosecute 
crime. In one case we tracked money from the Bahamas through Curacao, 
New York and London, but the paper trail stopped in Jersey and Guernsey 
……. It is unseemly that these British dependencies should be acting as 
havens for transactions that would not even be protected by Swiss bank 
secrecy laws” (The Observer, 22 September 1996, p. 19). 
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correspondently vulnerable to capital flight. Perversely, if also predictably, 
Jersey has found itself exposed to the very forces that, as a tax haven, it has 
sought successfully to harness. Jersey has, in some circles, acquired a 
reputation for offering its “legislature for hire” (Hampton and Christensen, 
1999). At any rate, it has sought to diversify its economy by offering LLP 
legislation with the hope that “its implementation in due course would 
encourage leading accounting and solicitors firms to be registered in Jersey 
…” (The Accountant, November 1996, p. 5).  
 
Doing Business with an OFC 
 
We have noted how the development of LLP legislation in Jersey was 
stimulated by the interest of UK based accounting firms rather than from any 
firm located in Jersey. The proposed legislation had to be scrutinized by the 
Jersey parliament whose institutional structures present their own challenges. 
The 53 part-time members of Jersey’s single chamber of parliament are 
directly elected by the public. Members of parliament meet for about 3-7 days 
a month and generally lack the organizational resources and political will to 
scrutinize the executive effectively. In the absence of political parties, it is 
extremely difficult to develop a coherent programme of reform let alone to 
subject the executive to close examination. The difficulties are compounded 
by weak local trade unions, a lack of pressure groups and a media that rarely 
questioned government policies. Indeed, until, the late 1990s, the Island’s 
main newspaper, Jersey Evening Post, was owned by a leading politician. 
Before 20056, Jersey did not have a formal cabinet, prime minister, chief 
minister or president. The island was governed by series of Committees (e.g. 
education, health, housing, finance and economics, etc.), each chaired by a 
President, which performed the functions normally associated with 
government ministries. A report reviewing Jersey’s machinery of government 
noted that “many decisions are taken by a small number of Committee 
members, perhaps only the President, or by the chief officer under delegated 
powers, and that other members are passengers, perhaps voluntarily, or 
                                                 
6 For post-2005 reforms see States of Jersey, 2000 and 2005. 
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perhaps because they are starved of information necessary for them to make 
informed decisions, or perhaps because they are overwhelmed by the masses 
of paperwork prepared for their meetings” (States of Jersey, 2000, para 
4.2.7). Prior to 2005, almost all the legislators were members of one or more 
committees and thus effectively members of the government. There were no 
equivalents of the US Senate hearings or the UK Parliamentary Select 
Committees to scrutinise legislation, government policy or the executive. 
During the 1990s, there was not even an official written record of 
parliamentary debates on major Bills. There was, and is, no official opposition 
in the Jersey parliament; and it is exceptional for members of one committee 
to criticise another. In short, given the combination of physical location, 
economic dependence and political disorganization, it is not difficult to 
appreciate why an OFC with Jersey’s profile would be attractive to accounting 
firms seeking help in extracting limited liability concessions from the UK 
government. 
 
Networks have been found to be central to facilitating the mobility of capital 
(McCahery and Picciotto 1995) and their role was not insignificant in the 
Jersey case. In pursuit of their strategies of enlisting the Jersey ‘sprats’ to 
catch the UK ‘mackerel’, Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young hired Ian 
Greer Associates, a prominent political lobbying firm with considerable 
connections with Jersey policymakers (The Observer, 6 October 1996, p. 1). 
As early as 6 June 1995, Mr. Ian James, a partner in the Jersey law firm of 
Mourant du Feu & Jeune, had met the Director of Jersey’s Financial Services 
Department (JFSD) to discuss the proposals developed by a London law firm, 
Simmons & Simmons, acting on behalf of Price Waterhouse and Ernst & 
Young. The Director of JFSD subsequently discussed the proposal with senior 
politicians and law officers (Sikka, 2008b). After further informal discussions, 
Messrs Mourant du Feu & Jeune formally wrote to President of the Jersey’s 
Finance & Economics Committee on 19 October 1995. The five page letter 
(for an extended extract see Cousins et al., 2004, pp. 28-29) stated,  
 
“My firm has been working with the UK partnership of Price 
Waterhouse (PW) and English solicitors, Slaughter and May, to find a 
 17
method of obtaining some limited liability protection for the partners’ 
personal assets without completely restructuring PW’s business … the 
most favoured solution would be the introduction of Special Limited 
Partnership Law in Jersey which would give the partners of a 
partnership registered under that law limited liability whilst permitting 
them to take part in the management of the Special Limited 
Partnership. … PW’s objective therefore is to find a means by which its 
partnership can have limited liability whilst retaining the characteristics 
of a partnership. … PW’s executive are satisfied that Jersey has all the 
necessary characteristics which makes it a suitable jurisdiction in which 
to register their UK partnership if appropriate legislation was passed by 
the States within the course of the next year. ….. We are therefore 
seeking support of your Committee for the introduction of a Special 
Limited Partnership Law in Jersey during 1996. We appreciate that this 
is a very short time scale and that there are many other legislative 
matters which have a high priority for the States of Jersey. We would 
therefore propose that, based on a draft law prepared by Mr. David 
Goldberg QC for PW, this firm in close co-ordination with the Financial 
Services Department, will work with PW and Slaughter and May in 
order to prepare a draft law for consideration by your Committee during 
December this year with a view to it being debated in the States in 
January/February 1996. We would also propose that we would prepare 
any necessary subordinate legislation required in connection with the 
Special Limited Partnership Law. … my firm is also instructed by the 
UK partnership of Ernst & Young.  … if the Committee is willing to 
proceed with this proposal that the States of Jersey’s PR firm, 
Shandwicks, are instructed to coordinate the publicity together with 
PW’s own PR people” (emphasis added). 
 
This letter formally set Jersey’s legal processes in motion. On 11 December 
1995, the States of Jersey announced that the Finance and Economics 
Committee was working to introduce LLP legislation. Price Waterhouse and 
Ernst & Young announced that they were cooperating with the Jersey 
authorities to draft a new partnership law (Accountancy Age, 14 December 
1995, p. 1 and 3). The Jersey government was assured that the law drafting 
work would be undertaken entirely at the expense of Price Waterhouse and 
Ernst & Young (Sikka, 2008b). The level of secrecy surrounding the draft law 
was reflected in the way that Jersey’s Law Society, which traditionally 
comments on draft laws, was initially denied the opportunity to comment, 
though subsequently it was given a very short period to do so. 
 
On 21 May 1996, Jersey finally published a much delayed 62-page draft Bill 
on LLPs (Limited Liability Partnerships (Jersey) Law 199). The Bill diluted the 
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principle of ‘joint and several’ liability and individual partners would not be 
personally liable for the liabilities of the LLP unless they actually caused the 
loss in the course of their work. The key features of the LLP Bill were that it 
required LLPs to have only a registered office address in Jersey. In this way, 
they could benefit from the LLP legislation without an agent or a partner 
operating in Jersey. The LLPs only needed to file an annual return and there 
was no need to publish audited accounts. Firms registering as LLPs could 
conduct, audit, insolvency, financial services (as regulated in the UK by the 
Companies Act 1985, Insolvency Act 1986 and the Financial Services Act 
1986) and any other kind of business. In Jersey, there was no dedicated 
regulator and no policies or procedures for investigating the conduct of errant 
auditors. LLPs registered in Jersey were to be exempt from all 
corporate/income taxes. The Jersey government reportedly hoped to levy 
£10,000 for an initial LLP registration and £5,000 annually thereafter (The 
Accountant, August 1996, p. 1). 
 
In line with Jersey’s normal legislative processes, senior politicians expected 
the Bill to be passed quickly and quietly. Unexpectedly, it encountered 
resistance and delay (see Cousins et al., 2004 and Sikka, 2008b for some 
details) and became “one of the most turbulent political debates in living 
memory” (Financial Times, 26 September 1996, p. 7). A senior partner of 
Price Waterhouse expressed dismay at this turn of events, “Earlier in the year 
[1996], we were roundly assured that the draft law would go to the States of 
Jersey Parliament in March/April, be nodded through, spend the summer with 
the Privy Council and be back in Jersey in time to be implemented in the 
statute book by September. Well, here we are in September and the Jersey 
Parliament is still arguing over its details” (Accountancy, September 1996, p. 
29).  The LLP law was eventually passed on 24 September 1996, followed by 
a further delay of nearly two years [in May 1998] before the insolvency 
provisions were enacted and an Ernst & Young senior partner announced 
that, “Having worked closely with the States of Jersey and Price Waterhouse 
to bring about the LLP law, we are pleased to see it finally being enacted” 
(Accountancy Age, 29 May 1998, p. 1).  
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During the three year period (1995-8), Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse 
continued to ratchet up the pressure on the UK government with threats to 
move their operations from the UK to Jersey (for example, see Financial 
Times, 8 December 1995, p. 1 and 15; The Times, 14 December 1995; 
Financial Times, 25 September 1996, p. 11; Accountancy, November 1996, p. 
19 Accountancy Age, 4 July 1996, p. 1; 12 December 1996, p. 3; 23 April 
1998, p. 3; Accountancy Age, 28 May 1998, p. 1; 4 June 1998, p. 9;).  The 
impact of these threats was, however, dampened by doubts about the 
feasibility of their implementation. For it is unlikely that the firms could have 
relocated their operations from the UK without major ramifications for tax, 
employment and contractual matters (Sikka, 1996; Sikka, 2008b). 
Nonetheless, the threats to move to Jersey were interpreted by commentators 
as “a cosh with which to threaten the [UK] government if it fails to come up 
with a workable LLP law” (Financial Times, 11 June 1998, p. 11).  Price 
Waterhouse and Ernst & Young “argued behind the scenes that the move to 
Jersey was a stick to beat the then Tory government and Labour opposition 
into agreeing that a UK-wide LLP Law was necessary. If that failed, they were 
serious about a move … PW insiders say it still wants a UK LLP law and the 
threat of  Jersey move is still a good stick to beat them with” (Accountancy 
Age, 4 June 1998, p. 9).  
 
Of particular note, the extended media exposure of the limited liability issue 
had the potential to damage claims that the UK state favoured business-
friendly policies. It is probable that this served to concentrate the minds of 
politicians. At one stage, the UK government promised equivalent legislation 
“within a week” (Financial Times, 28 June 1996, p. 22; 24 July 1996, p. 9) and 
then “at the earliest opportunity” (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 7 
November 1996, col. 617). A consultation document on creating limited 
liability partnerships was issued (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1997) 
followed by a Bill (in 1998), parliamentary scrutiny (in 1999 and 2000) and an 
Act7 (Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000) which came into existence on 6 
                                                 
7 The history of the UK LLP legislation is yet to be written. 
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April 2001.  The UK legislation8 was “warmly welcomed” by Price Waterhouse 
(Accountancy, December 1998, p. 124) and an Ernst & Young senior partner 
was claimed the credit for these developments:  “It was the work that Ernst & 
Young and Price Waterhouse undertook with the Jersey government …… that 
concentrated the mind of UK ministers on the structure of professional 
partnerships. ……The idea that two of the biggest accountancy firms plus, 
conceivably, legal, architectural and engineering and other partnerships, 
might take flight and register offshore looked like a real threat …… I have no 
doubt whatsoever that ourselves and Price Waterhouse drove it onto the 
government’s agenda because of the Jersey idea” (Accountancy Age, 29 
March 2001, p. 22). What, then, of the take-up of LLPs in Jersey?  On 28 
November 2000, the President of Jersey’s Finance and Economics 
Committee told parliament that “At the time the law was passed, there were 
reasonable grounds for supposing that the registration of LLPs could bring 
substantial benefit to Jersey. In the event, despite the passage of the 
legislation, no LLP has been registered” (Jersey Evening Post, 29 November 
2000).   The Jersey ‘sprat’ had served its purpose now that the UK ‘mackerel’ 
had been landed. 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
The state is at once a powerful sponsor and a prime target of the dynamic 
forces of capitalism and globalisation. It underpins property rights, commands 
a monopoly of the means of violence and is at the centre of processes of 
contestation and settlement that are more or less conducive to capital 
retention, attraction and accumulation. The relationship between (fractions of) 
capital and the (elements of) the state is complex and certainly not fixed. In 
the UK, accounting firms and accounting bodies have been adept at 
mobilizing the state to secure and expand markets for their services and to 
shield them from critical public scrutiny relating to allegations of audit failures 
and money laundering (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1998). Not 
only are these firms and bodies formed `in the context of government 
regulation’ but, as our case study of auditor liability has shown, they have 
                                                 
8 There are some differences between the Jersey and UK LLPs (for further 
details see, Sikka, 2008b). 
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`continued to flourish in that context’ (Hopwood, 1985: 13). .Notably, 
accountants have repeatedly secured concessions by diluting the redress 
available to injured stakeholders without any equivalent quid pro quo (i.e. 
without increasing auditor obligations or widening the scope of company 
audits). Through a `mutual intertwining with the modern conception of the 
State’ (ibid: 14), accounting bodies and firms have helped cement the UK 
state’s reputation for providing business-friendly policies, and these 
concessions have boosted accounting firm surpluses and shielded their 
partners from lawsuits.  
 
In the case examined in this chapter, leading accounting firms seized upon a 
convenient OFC, in the form of Jersey, as a lever with which to exert pressure 
upon the UK government to yield liability concessions. This case indicates 
how the global regulatory landscape is being altered by the growing indirect, 
as well as direct, use of OFCs. More broadly, it illustrates how OFCs are 
significant nodes in the global economy where their unchecked expansion and 
accessibility exerts comparatively veiled as well as more overt effects upon 
the regulative capacities of larger states. A significant impact of OFCs is upon 
the ability of states to track and tax flows of capital which, in turn, reduces the 
revenues available for spending on public goods, such as health and 
education. Our case study has shown how the existence of a welcoming OFC 
enabled accounting firms, as a fraction of capital, to press the UK state for a 
favourable recalibration of the balance of the risks and rewards pertaining to 
liabilities arising from their audit business. Persistent lobbying, backed by a 
substantial (£1m) investment in a threatened transfer of business out of the 
UK, has had the desired effect of preserving and enhancing the rewards 
flowing the accounting firms as liability risks previously privatized within 
partnerships have become socialized through their transfer to every taxpayer. 
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